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Federal Courts'and the.
Changing Role of American
Political Parties
RIcHARD

A. BRISBIN, JR.*

Themes of transformation and disarray characterize contemporary
scholarly assessments of the American party system. Although innovation is integral to the history of American parties, considerable research
supports Walter Dean Burnham's 1970 assertion that there is "an accelerating trend toward erosion of party linkages in the American
electorate,"' an erosion of support that is part of "a secular trend
toward the gradual disappearance of the political party in the United
States." ' It is theorized that declining party loyalty has decreased the
electoral function of local party organizations and that parties have
then been displaced by other associational forms such as the political
action committee.' Responding to the new associational forms, party
leaders have sought to resuscitate their party by strengthening national
party organizations and by employing a professional staff to assist
national party leaders.' Unfortunately, party leaders have yet to impress the voting public or public officials with the utility or relevance
of these organizational reforms. In an age of direct relations with
* Assistant Professor of Government, Saint Mary's College, Notre Dame, Indiana. B.A. West Virginia Wesleyan College, M.A., Ph.D. The Johns Hopkins
University.
The author extends thanks to Charles Hadley, C. Richard Hofstetter, Patrick
Pierce, and Catherine Rudder.
1. W. BURHAM, CRITICAL ELECTIONS AND THE MAINSPRINGS OF AMERICAN
POLITICS 119, 133 (1970).
2. Id.

3. See W. CROTrY & G. JACOBSON, AMERICAN PARTIES IN DECLINE 65-166
(1980); J. KIRKPATRICK, DISMANTLING THE PARTIES (1978); E. LADD wrrH C. HADLEY,

TRANSFORMATIONS OF THE AMERICAN PARTY SYSTEM 342-48 (2d ed. 1978); M. MALBIN,
PARTIES, INTEREST GROUPS, AND CAMPAIGN FINANCE (1980); Dennis, Trends inPublic
Support for the American Party System 5 BRIT. J. POL. SCI. 187, 187-230 (1976);
Pomper, The Decline of Party in American Elections 92 POL. SCI. Q. 21, 21-42 (1977).
4. See Cotter & Bibby, Institutional Development of Parties and the Thesis
of Party Decline, 95 POL. ScI. Q. 1, 1-27 (1980). These authors undervalue the reactive
aspects of the extension of national party organization in their description of a permanent national party headquarters with full-time personnel, financial capacity to
do research and conduct polling, and the ability continually to work with state party
organizations and party caucuses.
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constituency the parties do not provide legislators or executives with
popular votes as effectively as personal campaign staffs.5 Also, legislators are so accustomed to servicing constituents and being buffeted
by the liaison activities of executives that they are willing to ignore
party policy pressures. 6
The change has affected not only party loyalty, party organization,
and party policy functions but also, the constitutional status of parties has undergone a transformation. The purpose of this essay is to
delineate recent changes in the constitutional status of parties. First,
discussing the relevancy of constitutional rules for parties, the essay
examines demands for changes in the constitutional rules, the choices
made in response to the demands, and the ramifications of the choices.
From the delineation of the constitutional rules affecting parties is
drawn an evaluation of the implications of constitutional standards
for the future of American political parties.
I.

CONSTITUTION AND

PARTY

In legalistic terms, American political parties possess no constitutional status; the United States Constitution does not mention parties.
In addition, early post-revolutionary sentiment disfavored the practice
of politics by small cohesive groups. Founders such as James Madison
railed against the factions, including the political parties, which existed
in their era. 7 To insensibly rely, however, on the written constitution
and the intent of the framers is to disregard the "living" or "organic"
constitutional status of parties.' Inquiries into the nature of the constisupra note 3, at 65-99; J. KINGDON, CANDIDATES
108-35 (1968); R. SCOTT & R. HREBENAR, PARTIES
IN CRISES 191-227 (2d ed. 1985); AGRANOFF, The New Style of Campaigning, in THE
NEW STYLE IN ELECTION CAMPAIGNS 3-50 (R. Agranoff ed., 2d ed., 1976).
6. The limited influence of parties on congressional behavior is revealed by
the paucity of discussions of party influence in recent evaluations of Congress, in5. See

CROTTY

&

JACOBSON,

FOR OFFICE; BELIEFS AND STRATEGIES

cluding M.

FIORINA,

CONGRESS: KEYSTONE OF THE WASHINGTON ESTABLSIHMENT

(1978)

(which emphasizes the importance of constituency service in elections); J. KINGDON,
CONGRESSMEN'S VOTING DECISIONS (2d ed. 1981) (which emphasizes collegial and constituency variables in relation to congressional electoral behavior); D. MAYHEW, CONGRESS: THE ELECTORAL CONNECTION (1974) (which emphasizes the importance of reelection for members of Congress and yet never discusses party politics).

7.

THE FEDERALIST

No. 10 (J. Madison).

8. The "living" or "organic" constitution is the basic system of rules and
institutional arrangements that define and limit governmental behavior in a polity.
It includes fundamental law, ordinary law, and extralegal norms that serve the basic
function of defining and limiting governmental power. It is subject to political enforcement, but its legitimacy rests on its formal enactment, reason and truth (including principles of natural justice), and on the usage and acceptance of certain
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°
tution from Alexis de Tocqueville9 to Carl J. Friedrich" to contemporary public choice theoristsII indicate that the fundamental principles
of government are more than the mechanical rules of the written docu-

ment. The written document describes institutional power relationships
and the contours of rights, but the meaning of its words and the
legitimacy of institutions must be determined through its application
over time.
As a constitution is applied, its "component parts may undergo
significant alterations."1 2 The fundamental institutions usually remain,
but the customs, traditions, religion, and social condition of the public
3
can alter constitutional practice or interpretation. The fundamental
law or fundamental principles for political choice of constitutional
interpretation may be altered as new practices and institutions become
recognized as legitimate interests. When individuals anticipate or realize
greater benefits from adhering to rules or association with institutions
than those which may be obtained through acting individually, the
4
rule or institution will, in practice, become fundamental.' The rule
or institution retains its fundamental nature and legitimacy as long
as it coordinates individual behavior toward an equilibrium. The
equilibrium is a state achieved when individuals prefer the rule or
institution chosen by the collective 5to the ambiguity of acting without
a collective behavioral standard.
practices across time (as with judicial review, a role for parties in government). See

24-37, 133 (4th ed.
CONSTITUTIONALISM,
in
Framework,
Analytic
1968); T. GREY, Constitutionalism: An
189-209 (J. Pennock and J. Chapman, eds. 1980); H. McBAIN, THE LIVING CONSTITUTION 1-33 (1929).
9. Tocqueville, Alexis de, 1805-59, French politician and writer. He was prominent in politics during the French Revolution of 1848 and was minister of foreign
affairs briefly in 1849. His observations made during a government mission to the
United States resulted in DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA, one of the classics in political
literature.
10. Carl J. Friedrich, late Professor of Government, Harvard University. Professor Friedrich authored such works as RESPONSIBLE BUREAUCRACY, 1932; CONSTITU-

C.

FRIEDRICH, CONSTITUTIONAL GOVERNMENT AND DEMOCRACY,

TIONAL

GOVERNMENT

AND

DEMOCRACY,

1941; and THE

PHILOSOPHY

OF LAW

IN

HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE, 1963.

11. See R. ABRAMS, FOUNDATIONS OF POLITICAL ANALYSIS 5-39 (1980) (survey
of public choice theories about constitutions).
12. See, e.g., C. FRIEDRICH, LIMITED GOVERNMENT 11 (1974).

13. C.

FRIEDRICH, MAN AND HIS GOVERNMENT 270-75 (1965); C. FRIEDRICH,
(1964); A. TOCQUEVILLE, 1 DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 298-342
ed. 1945); W. MCWILLIAMS, The American Constitutions, in THE PER-

TRANSCENDENT JUSTICE

(P. Bradley

FORMANCE OF AMERICAN

14. J.
15. E.

GOVERNMENT 1-28 (G. Pomper ed. 1972).
& G. TULLOCK, THE CALCULUS OF CONSENT 63-84

BUCHANAN
ULLMANN-MARGALIT,

THE EMERGENCE OF NORMS

74-89 (1977).

(1965).
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American parties emerged as an ad hoc constitutional institution
precisely because individuals realized greater benefit from adhering
to these collective institutions than from acting alone to nominate
leaders or advance policies. The party especially served both "psychological" and "constitutional" needs beyond the purview of the
written document, and it did so until recent decades in a manner
citizens deemed fundamental. Parties bound people emotionally to
leaders and created a sense of public involvement in government that
provided legitimacy for the institutions of the written constitution.
Parties, even more importantly, developed the institutional means for
the coordinating of elections, of communications between electors and
officials, and of legislative behavior.' 6 As an institution governed by
rules, political parties became a fundamental part of the coordination
of individual political behavior and acquired a legitimacy overcoming
the ambiguity of electoral and policy choice for individual electors
and legislators.
Organic constitutional rules or institutions such as parties can
easily erode. Individuals can withdraw support for the rule and
use force to react to foreign insults to American citizens can rather
easily be eroded. Individuals can withdraw support for the rule and
undercut the equilibrium that supports the practice so that it may
no longer be regarded as fundamental. With written principles, the
process of change is more difficult since it requires changes in the
document that can only be made by a complex amendment procedure
or by judicial interpretation. In recent decades change in the constitutional status of parties began as individuals withdrew their support
for a party by choosing non-participation or by determining not to
have a party identity."7 Yet, because state legislatures, and to a lesser
extent the Congress, had supported the organic constitutional status
of parties through the enactment of statutes, parties retained numerous
advantages in the electoral process and in legislatures.' 8 Individuals
who sought the same advantages as party members had two alternatives: attempt to change the statutes in a legislature dominated by
party activists, or challenge the statutes in court. Litigation became
16. MCWILLLMS, supra note 13, at 28-31.
17. For discussions of the causes of party decline, see S. ELDERSVELD, POLITICAL
PARTIES N AMEmicAN SOCIETY, 409-25 (1982); E. LADD, WHERE HAVE ALL THE VOTERS
GONE? 53-58 (1978); F. SORAUF, PARTY POLITICS IN AMERICA 417-31 (5th ed. 1984);
Pomper, The Decline of the Party in American Elections, 92 POL. SCi. Q. 21, 21-41
(1977); A. RANNEY, The PoliticalParties, in THE NEW AMERICAN POLITICAL SYSTEM
213-47 (A. King. ed. 1978).
18. See SORAUF, supra note 17, at 245-53. Much of the text in section III
serves as further illustration of this point.
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the preferred strategy because of its lower costs and the potential of
a favorable ruling obtained through judicial review."
II.

DEMANDS

FOR CONSTITUTIONAL CHANGE IN PARTY STATUS

Individuals demanding a change in the statutes affirming a fundamental or constitutional status for parties have to make an initial determination about the form in which to voice their challenge. Traditionally
the forums have been the state legislatures and the state courts, but
since 1940 the federal courts have more frequently become the forum."0
In federal courts successful challenges could achieve a nationwide
change in party status with minimum costs by making claims of individual liberty.
The dearth of federal judicial decisions affecting political parties
prior to 1940 indicates the dominance of the theory of dual federalism"'
and the concept of reserved state police powers.2 2 With the passing
of dual federalism, the federal judiciary extended its oversight of the
electoral process. The development of emphasis on the need to protect
minorities from unrestrained majorities and the recognition of the
vulnerability of democratic institutions to racism in constitutional
jurisprudence significantly contributed to increased federal judicial oversight of elections. "3 The first noteworthy judicial attention to parties
4
and elections came in United States v. Classic,1
wherein the opinion
broadly interpreted the word "elections" in the constitution and federal
statutes to permit a federal inquiry into corruption in a locally-governed
primary election for local and congressional offices." Three years later,
in Smith v. Allwright "6 the Court allowed challenges to racially
19. The concept that judges possess the power to review the constitutionality
of laws is not found in the constitution. Justice Marshall, in Marbury v. Madison,
5 U.S. (I Cranch) 137 (1803), wrote that such power although not written in the
constitution is confirmed and strengthened in principle by the Constitution.
20. See Starr, The Legal Status of American Political Parties, 34 AM. POL.
Sci. REv. 439, 439-55, 685-99 (June 1940).

21. Dual federalism is the conception of the federal system that views the powers
of the national government and the states as mutually exclusive, antagonistic, and
conflictual. See E. CORWIN, THE TWELIGHT OF THE SUPREME COURT 11-15 (1934).

22. Reserved state police power is the exclusive power of states to legislate for
the public health, safety, welfare, and morals. See E. CORWIN, supra note 21, at
65-67 (1934).

23. See Bixby, The Roosevelt Court, Democratic Ideology, and Minority Rights:
Another Look at United States v. Classic, 90 YALE L.J. 741, 741-815 (1981).
24. 313 U.S. 299 (1941).

25. See id. at 318-19, 324-27.
26. 321 U.S. 649 (1944).
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discriminatory state primary election laws to be raised in federal courts.
By treating racial discrimination in a party primary to be state action
violating the fifteenth amendment, the Supreme Court opened the
federal courts to suits seeking redress of discrimination effected by
state and party.27
Federal litigation concerning political parties remained largely
limited to racial discrimination claims until the case of Williams v.
Rhodes.28 Coming in the midst of what Austin Ranney called the "third
great epoch of party reform,'' 29 Williams was a decision of major
significance. First, the decision overturned an Ohio law defining
political parties so that the Democratic and Republican parties alone
could qualify for a position on the ballot. 3" Using the equal protection
clause of the fourteenth amendment,"1 the Court determined that the
state law was an invidious discrimination against minor parties and
independent candidacies. 3 2 Equal protection had thus emerged as the
instrument for questioning state laws affecting parties and for challenging the internal operations of parties. In addition to expanding the
possibility of constitutional litigation against parties, Williams completed the nationalization of the electoral process. In the decade of
the 1960's, the Supreme Court secured federal judicial and/or legislative
control over apportionment,33 intimidation and discrimination at the
27. See id. at 663-64.
28. 393 U.S. 23 (1968). Under Ohio election laws a new political party seeking
ballot position in presidential elections was required to obtain petitions signed by
qualified electors totaling 1507o of the number of ballots cast in the most recent gubernatorial election and file the petition in early February of the election year. Republican
and Democratic parties were not required to obtain signature petitions. The Ohio
Independent Party and the Socialist Labor Party challenged the law as a violation
of the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment.
29. A.

RANNEY,

CURING THE MISCKIEFS OF FACTION: PARTY REFORM IN AMERICA

19-21 (1975).
30. OHIo REV. CODE ANN. §§ 3517.02-3517.04 required a political party
to elect a state central committee consisting of two members from each congressional district and county central committees for each county in Ohio.
Section 3505.10 required a party to elect delegates and alternates to a national convention. Section 3513.19.1 prohibited a candidate from seeking the office of delegate
to the national convention if he voted as a member of a different party at a primary
election in the preceding four year period. The effect was to require a new party
to have over 1200 members, willing to seek elective office, who had not previously
voted in another party's primary. OHio REV. CODE ANN. §§ 3505.10, 3513.19.1,
3517.02-3517.04 (Page 1972).
31. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV,

§ 1.

32. 393 U.S. 23, 30-34 (1968).
33. See, e.g., Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1 (1964); Wright v. Rockefeller,
376 U.S. 52 (1964).
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polls, 34 voter qualifications, 35 equality in voting, 36 and speech and press
related to electioneering37 through decisions based upon the Bill of
Rights and the equal protection guarantee. 38 Williams extended nationalization of controls over political activity from elections into party
behavior.
By 1970 it would seem that federal courts could have developed
a consistent set of constitutional standards pertaining to political parties, and define the appropriate role of parties in the process of governance. Yet, the federal judiciary was not to achieve this possibility.
Cases concerning political parties arrived in the federal courts helterskelter, and often just before an impending election. Although limited
immediate relief could be afforded in these cases, a notable lack of
serious thought about the role of political parties characterized the
judicial opinions.3 9 The failure of the courts to elucidate bounds for
party activity may have been due, at least in part, to the fact that
no organizations contributed advice to the courts or pursued patterns
of litigation. The major national parties and the interest groups did
not seem very interested in these cases. 0 Instead, the federal judiciary
became a last resort for conflicts involving minor parties like the
Socialist Workers and Libertarians and the non-party candidates like
Eugene McCarthy' and John Anderson."2 The failure of the courts
also may have resulted in part from the peculiar nature of some of
the challenged statutes. 3 As a result of these phenomena, cases were
34. See, e.g., United States v. Guest, 383 U.S. 745 (1966); United States v.
Price, 383 U.S. 787 (1966).
35. See, e.g., Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641 (1966) (striking down literacy
tests); Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1966) (prohibiting poll taxes).
36. See, e.g., Gray v. Sanders, 372 U.S. 368 (1963) (one man-one vote).
37. See, e.g., Mills v. Alabama, 384 U.S. 214 (1966).
38. See South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301 (1966); United States
v. Guest, 383 U.S. 745 (1966); Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964); R. CLAUDE,
THE SUPREME COURT AND THE ELECTORAL PROCEss 265-68 (1970).

39. See supra notes 23-37 and accompanying text.
40. Major parties and interest groups did not participate in any cases discussed
in this section and cited in notes 19 to 38, inclusive, as parties or as amicus curiae.
41. Member of the United States Sehate from Minnesota, 1958-1970; independent candidate for president, 1976.
42. Member of the United States House of Representatives from Illinois,
1961-1981; Independent candidate for president, 1980. See cases, infra notes 107-13
and accompanying text on John Anderson's electoral legal difficulties.
43. Illustrations of complex or peculiar statutes that come before federal courts
are provided in section III of this article. This section considers at length statutes
designed to deny party membership to minorities, to screen out candidates, to prevent "sore losers," to restrict the growth of new parties, to insure the power of
party leaders, and to restrict party participation through obscure and technical rules.
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adjudicated and precedents set with concern more for immediate
demands of the litigants rather than the long-term constitutional status
of American political parties.
III.
A.

JUDICIAL CHOICES ON THE STATUS OF PARTIES

STANDARD FOR ANALYSIS

The analysis of judicial decisions affecting the constitutional status
of parties must begin with a recognition of the fluidity of the American
definition of "party". The impact of judicial decisions concerning
parties can only be gauged if some categorization of definitions and
concepts with respect to parties is made for comparison to the emphasis, assumptions, and consistency of ideas in the federal judicial
decisions. From a survey of the literature" on the history and operations of parties, four fundamental definitions of the role of American
parties have been located. Table I (pages 40-41) summarizes information on the four definitions of party roles. The four definitions of
party roles should be regarded as ideal-types designed to encapsulate
four different sets of assumptions about the proper place of parties
in a representative government. The four definitions include a brief
statement of the objective or goal, and the incentives necessary to
maintain the party as an organization, plus a statement of the various
functions or activities of a party that supports its objectives and permits identification of its incentive system. The functions include the
activities of parties as electoral agents, as governors and organizers
of official decisionmaking, and as organizations or apparatuses allowing
people to share or aggregate their political views and possibly mobilize
to articulate policy positions.
Each of the four definitions of the role of American parties
deserve brief elaboration. Table I applies a working label to each definition of party roles, but little meaning should be read into this label.
The objective or goal of each definition of party summarizes the
predominant objective of the party. 5 While nearly every historical
44. See, e.g., M. DUVERGER, POLITICAL PARTIES 4-205 (1954); L. EPSTEIN,
POLITICAL PARTIES IN WESTERN DEMOCRACIES (1967); V. KEY, PARTIES, POLITICS, AND
PRESSURE GROUPS 199-227 (5th ed. 1964); N. McDONALD, THE STUDY OF POLITICAL

PARTIES 9-36 (1955); F. SORAUF, supra note 17; Lowi, Toward Functionalism in
Political Science: The Case of Innovation in Party Systems 57 AM. POL. ScI. REV.
570, 570-83 (1963); A. RANNEY, The Concept of "Party", in POLITICAL RESEARCH
AND POLICAL THEORY 146-50 (0. Garceau, ed. 1968); Schlesinger, The Primary Goals
of PoliticalParties: A Clarificationof Positive Theory 69 AM. POL. Sci. REV. 840,

840-49 (1975).

45. Simon, On the Concept of OrganizationalGoal, 9 AD. SCI. Q. 1, 1-22 (1964)

(argues that multiple participant organizations may have members who would assign
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or intellectual definition of parties admits that parties feature a mix
of objectives, the aspiration of establishing standards for analysis has
demanded the discernment of the predominant objective along lines
suggested by Neil McDonald and Austin Ranney." Each separate
definition of party objectives relies on different incentives for its
maintenance. As James Q. Wilson points out in his studies of political
organizations, the goals or objectives of organizations like parties can
only be secured if people have a perception that the organization might
benefit them. 7 In the United States, the four definitions of party objectives presume four distinct ways of binding people into a party. If
any incentive used to maintain a party fails, for moral, social, or
legal reasons to bind people to a party, support for that party may
wane, or its character may change. The final sections of Table I briefly
describe the functions of the political party under each definition.
The functions of parties are the activities or tasks engaged in by party
personnel; activities that support and actualize the incentives binding
people into a party. The three selected functions of parties that are
briefly defined appear in the work of Frank Sorauf, although a few
minor liberties have been taken in applying his definitions. 8
If a transformation in the constitutional status of parties is occurring in the United States, it could be located by reference to these
ideal-types of party behavior. For example, judicial decisions might
legalize or facilitate the realization of all, one, or none of the objectives
of parties. Judicial action also might either legitimate or prohibit the
use of certain incentives for party maintenance. Additionally, the
judiciary could proscribe or condition the operation of party functions so as to deny the use of incentives for procuring loyalty to a
party. In considering party functions the judiciary might also intervene
in ways that undercut the functions of any party. Complete erosion
of incentives maintaining any objective could result. Finally, the
judiciary could create a hodgepodge of decisions pertaining to party
objectives, incentives, and functions. The confusion generated by a
plethora of ill conceived decisions might render people incapable of
operating and maintaining stable parties. The next section will apply
the ideal-types of party role definition to federal judicial decisions
to determine if any of these possibilities of party disarray or erosion
assorted goals to the organization but that one goal will predominate among leadership and be used to constrain the realization of the goals defined by other members).
46. N. McDONALD, supra note 44, at 9-36; A. RN,
supra note 44, at 146-50;
Schlesinger, supra note 44, at 840-49.
47. J. WILSON, POLITICAL ORGANIZATIONS 30-51, 95-116 (1973).
48. See F. SoELAuF, supra note 17, at 9-14.
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have occurred in judicial treatment of the constitutional status of
parties.
B.

JUDICIAL ACTION

Federal judicial action affecting the constitutional status of political
parties has only addressed selected aspects of the electoral, governmental, and organizational functions of parties. Judicial decisions in
cases of racial discrimination in the party nominating process, ballot
access for party and non-party candidates, the physical position of
parties on the ballot, the internal party selection of nominees and
party officers, and campaign finance by the party have affected the
organizational function of parties. Two categories of conflicts, those
dealing with the participation of civil servants in parties and those
dealing with patronage employment practices, involve the governmental
function. Cases involving the electoral function include disputes over
party registration laws and the mobilization of support by parties
alleged to be opposing the constitutional system.
1. Party OrganizationalFunctions
Of the issues involving the organizational function of parties, the
federal courts considered cases concerning racial discrimination in the
selection of party nominees by primary election. A state-enforced ban
on the participation of blacks in primary elections in Texas was voided
by the Supreme Court in 1927." 9 Five years later the Court deemed
unconstitutional another Texas law permitting the State Democratic Executive Committee to determine who qualified for voting in the
primary." It found the "repositories of official power" had, by assigning control of elections to the party organization, "discharged their
official functions in such a way as to discriminate invidiously between
white citizens and black"."l Although in Grovey v. Townsend" Justice
Roberts, writing for the majority, separated the "privilege of membership in a party" from "the right to vote for one who is to hold a
public office,"" thereby permitting a racially discriminatory primary
established and operated by the Democratic Party, vestiges of racial
discrimination in primaries remained under close scrutiny.
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.

Nixon v. Herndon, 273 U.S. 536 (1927).
Nixon v. Condon, 286 U.S. 73 (1932).
Id. at 88-89.
295 U.S. 45 (1935), overruled, 321 U.S. 649 (1944).
Id. at 55.
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In United States v. Classic, 4 the court held that primaries were
within the orbit of state action because they were "by law an integral
part of the procedure of choice."" The Court then overruled Grovey
in Smith v. Allwright,5' finding that the Texas Democratic Party took
"its character as a state agency from the duties imposed upon it by
state statutes. . ."" on precinct elections, delegate selection to party
conventions, the construction of the general election ballot, and judicial
enforcement of the duties of party officials. By ruling that political
party activities involved state action, the Court narrowed the private
character of parties and recognized their public function as an integral
part of the electoral process.
Southern efforts to permit racial discrimination in the selection
of nominees did not end with the decision in Smith. The Court of
Appeals for the Fourth Circuit overturned a South Carolina law which
gave parties complete control of primaries, ruling that political parties
had "become in effect state institutions, governmental agencies through
which sovereign power is exercised by the people." 5 8 A subsequent
Texas law allowed the Jaybird Democratic Association to operate a
private primary. 9 The Supreme Court held the Texas procedure made
the public primary and general elections "perfunctory ratifiers of the
choice that has already been made in Jaybird elections," and therefore
the Jaybird election was part of the electoral process and open to
challenge as state action discriminating against minorities in violation
of the fifteenth amendment. 60 In Gray v. Sanders6 ' the conducting
of the primary election by the Georgia Democratic Party was considered state action by the Supreme Court. The Court then voided
the county-unit system of weighing votes used by the party in its postprimary nominations process because, "once the class of voters is
chosen and their qualifications specified, we see no constitutional way
by which equality of voting power may be evaded." ' 62 The inequality
in weighing votes had an intensified impact on black voters, while
54. 313 U.S. 299 (1941).
55. Id. at 318-19.

56. 321 U.S. 649, 663 (1944). A black was refused a ballot in a congressional
primary election by a Harris County, Texas election judge. The Texas Democratic
Party by resolution on May 24, 1932 had prohibited blacks from party membership.
57. Id.

58. Rice v. Elmore, 165 F.2d 387, 389 (4th Cir. 1947), cert. denied, 333 U.S.
875 (1948).
59. TEx. ELEC.

CODE ANN.

art. 13.54 (Vernon 1967).

60. Terry v. Adams, 345 U.S. 461, 469 (1953).
61. 372 U.S. 368 (1963).
62. Id.at 381.
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more generally affecting most of the Georgia electorate. The adoption
of the 1965 Voting Rights Act 63 largely eliminated the necessity for
further challenges of Southern primary election laws on racial grounds.6 "
The issues of the racial discrimination cases were straight-forward
conflicts between minority voter rights and the power of parties as
agencies of the states. The issues became more complex after the ballot
access dispute in Williams v. Rhodes 5 added the rights of candidates
to the conflicts already existing between voter rights and party power.
At issue was Williams' ability to become a candidate in Ohio where,
as Justice Black wrote, it was "virtually impossible" for any party
candidate to qualify under state law except as Democrat or Republican
candidates." In ballot access cases prior to Williams the Supreme Court
had not permitted non-racial constitutional claims of discrimination
to stand. The Court found no intentional or purposeful discrimination
issues that violated the fourteenth amendment in a ballot access dispute
because the matter fell under state rather than federal law. 6'7 Later,
a claim of the Progressive Party that an Illinois statute regulated ballot
access through a complex discriminatory petitioning scheme was
dismissed. 61 In 1952 Justice Reed, writing for the majority in Ray
v. Blair," allowed political parties to restrict candidates for presidential elector ruling that, "[a] candidacy in the primary is a voluntary
act of the applicant. He is not barred, discriminatorily, from par70
ticipating but he must comply with the rules of the party."
The Williams decision swept away precedent by allowing challenges
to state ballot access laws that allegedly violated the equal protection
guarantee of the fourteenth amendment. As well, the decision established a compelling state interest test which states must meet in restricting ballot access. 7 ' Under this test states were required to show
a compelling interest which is furthered by, and a non-invidiously
discriminatory rationale for, preventing voters from casting votes for
a party. In applying the test to the challenged Ohio law, the Court
found an impermissible encumbrance on the right to vote. As the
Court obliquely stated:
63. 42 U.S.C. § 1971 et seq. (1965).
64. Hadnott v. Amos, 394 U.S. 358, 364 (1969). The Court, relying upon the
first and fifteenth amendments, plus Voting Rights Act provisions, ruled unconstitutional Alabama laws which restricted the ability of blacks to "ban together for the
advancement of political beliefs". Id.
65. 393 U.S. 23 (1968).
66. Id. at 25.
67. Snowden v. Hughes, 321 U.S. 1 (1944).
68. MacDougall v. Green, 335 U.S. 281 (1948). See infra note 102.
69. 343 U.S. 214 (1952).
70. Id. at 230.
71. 393 U.S. at 31-32.
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[tihe right to form a party for the advancement of political goals
means little if a party can be kept off the election ballot and thus
denied an equal opportunity to win votes. So also, the right to vote
is heavily burdened if that vote may be cast only for one of two
parties at a time when other parties are clamoring for a place on
the ballot."
The Court also found that "[c]ompetition in ideas and governmental policies is at the core of our electoral process and of the First
Amendment freedoms." 3 After making these observations concerning
the fundamental rights of voters, the Court dismissed Ohio's contentions that the law survived the constitutional test because it provided
party stability, assured winners representing the majority, and would
4
avoid long ballots and voter confusion.1
Chief Justice Earl Warren, in his dissent in Williams, charged
that key issue of state control over ballot access remained
"unresolved."" In the next five years a series of Supreme Court decisions validated the kernel of his charge. Jenness v. Fortson,"' written
by Justice Stewart, a partial dissenter in Williams, upheld a Georgia
law requiring non-party candidates to pay a filing fee and submit petitions signed by five percent of the number of voters at the last general
election for the office in question. The Court did not meticuously
consider the right to vote or associate, but simply ruled that the
Georgia law "[did] not operate to freeze the political status quo," '7
and did not insulate "a single potential voter from the appeal of new
political voices within its borders." 8 The timid scrutiny of rights in
Jenness created an apparent contradiction addressed in three 1974
Supreme Court actions: Storer v. Brown,79 American Party v. White,8"
and Lubin v. Panish."
The Court reviewed California rules for independent candidacies
in Storer. A "sore loser" rule that prevented independent candidates
from qualifying for the ballot if they had voted in the immediately
preceding primary of a party or if they had been a registered party

72.
73.
74.
75.
76.
77.
78.
79.
80.
81.

Id.at 31.
Id. at 32.
Id. at 32-33.
Id. at 69 (Warren, C. J. dissenting).
403 U.S. 431 (1971).
Id. at 438.
Id. at 442.
415 U.S. 724 (1974).
415 U.S. 767 (1974).
415 U.S. 709 (1974).
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member in the previous year was the primary focus of the Court's
inquiry. The law prevented party primary losers from running as independents in the general election. The Court upheld the rule because
it fulfilled "the State's interest in the stability of its political system",
an interest adjudged "not only permissible, but compelling and as
outweighing the interest the candidate and his supporters may have
in making a late rather than an early decision to seek independent
ballot status." 8 2 Also, the Court found that the general rules to qualify
as an independent aside from the sore loser provision did not impermissibly burden candidates' rights.83
The American Party decision upheld a Texas law that prevented
the ballot listing of small parties unless they had obtained two percent of the vote at the previous general election or had submitted
petitions with signatures of registered voters exeeding one percent of
the vote at the previous general election. The Court determined that
the law promoted state interests in "preservation of the integrity of
the electoral process and regulating the number of candidates on the
' '8
ballot to avoid undue voter confusion. 4
Lubin v. Panish involved a challenge to filing fees for candidates
seeking to have their names placed on the ballot. Ruling that~a fee,
when used as the sole criteria for access to the ballot was invidiously
discriminatory, the Court stated it was "not a certain test of whether
the candidacy is serious or spurious.''8 Yet, the opinion implied states
might use other less discriminatory means to prevent frivolous
candidacies.86 Additionally, the decision followed the earlier filing fee
case of Bullock v. Carter87 in which the Court had refused to create
a "fundamental" right to be a candidate for public office, finding
that restrictions on the rights of candidates are less subject to equal
protection scrutiny than restrictions on the rights of voters.8 8
The result of the decisions from Williams to the 1974 cases caused
a mixed standard of review to appear. Judges were to review with
care state laws restricting the right to vote in political party elections,
but state laws impeding a candidate from appearing on a ballot and
from winning votes were subject to a lower level of scrutiny. The
net effect of the mixed standard was that states could more easily
regulate candidacies without offending constitutional rights.
82.
83.
84.
85.
86.
87.
88.

415 U.S. 724, 736.
Id. at 728-38.
415 U.S. 767, 782 n.14.
415 U.S. 709, 717.
Id.at 715-19.
405 U.S. 134 (1972).
Id.at 143-44.
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A problem remains because of the overlapping effect of laws
regulating the right to vote and laws regulating candidacies. A law
regulating a candidacy may affect the voting or associational rights
of potential supporters of the candidacy.19 In resolving such a conflict,
the Supreme Court decisions afford few guidelines. In practice, federal
judges must balance state interests, candidates' rights to ballot access, and the rights of potential voters in ballot access cases using
two separate tests. First, the right of voters to have options at the
polls is fundamental.9 0 It is a right capable of being impinged only
by state laws serving the "compelling interest" of clearly assuring
the integrity of the voting process or diminishing voter confusion."
Since a "compelling interest" is difficult to prove, voter rights usually
can be limited only by laws preventing direct perversion of electoral
machinery. Second, the balance of candidate equal protection rights
and a state's interest is struck by reviewing the probable effect of
a restrictive state law upon a candidate's ability to obtain a position
on the ballot to see if the restriction is substantial enough for equal
protection analysis.' 2 Even if the restriction is substantial, the law
still may not violate the equal protection guarantee. A court must
find a burden of substance to the candidate that cannot be relieved
by other electoral procedures and that is not caused by the candidate's
actions.' 3 States may also create "rational" restrictions or burdens
on some candidates to control ballot size and preserve the integrity
of the election."
The application of the two-tier test9s to ballot access cases has
89. For example, a law might require a percentage of signatures of previous
voters for a candidate to be listed on the ballot. A failure to attain the signatures
could prevent the exercise of rights of other citizens through the vote or to associate
in a campaign.
90. See Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23, 31 (1968).
91. See Storer v. Brown, 415 U.S. 724, 736 (1974); American Party v. White,
415 U.S. 767, 782 (1974).
92. See Storer v. Brown, 415 U.S. 724, 728-38.
93. See Lubin v. Panish, 415 U.S. 709, 717.
94. See id. at 715-19.
95. On the two-tier test, see Note, The Irrebuttable Presumption Doctrine in
the Supreme Court, 87 HAIv. L. REv. 1534, 1535-36 n.9 (1974). On its use of the
test in political party and election cases, see L. TRENE, AmERICAN CONSTrruTIONAL
LAW 777-84 (1978); AHRENs & HAUSERMAN, FundamentalElection Rights: Association, Voting and Candidacy, 14 VAL. U.L. REV. 465, 465-85 (1980); Einhorn,
Nominating Petition Requirement for Third-Party and Independent Candidate Ballot
Access, 11 SUFFOLK U.L. REV. 979, 979-83 (1977); Note, The Party Affiliation Requirement: A Constitutional Inquiry, 16 NEw ENG. L. REV. 71, 89-92 (1980-81);
Comment, A Case Study in Equal Protection: Voting Rights Decisions and a Plea
for Consistency, 70 Nw. U.L. REV. 934, 935-41 (1976).
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a special significance for political parties. Whether the federal courts
uphold voter rights of the first tier or the less fundamental candidate
rights of the second tier in these cases, the decision would invalidate
a state law written to favor the nominees of established parties and
perpetuate the status of the established political parties as fundamental
institutions in the electoral process.
Legislated by politicians eager to preserve the two party system
and to prevent candidacies threatening the intra-party benefits that
party leaders derive from the distribution of the reward of nomination, most state laws on ballot access function against the efforts of
a non-party candidate to stimulate voter allegiance through mass appeals targeted at party members. The balancing of interests which
the two-tier test requires of the federal judiciary has eroded some
of the protections for political parties established in these state laws.
The decisions, however, lack a clear logic as to how states may regulate
to protect parties. These decisions only partially free candidates from
the need to have a party or similar organization if they want to advance
their candidacy.
Applying this two-tier analysis, federal courts struck down state
laws involving party affiliation, deadline, and petition requirements,
usually for want of a compelling state interest. State laws judged invalid
included provisions preventing non-party candidates from petitioning
for ballot access, 96 allowing only write-in votes for non-party
candidates,97 or requiring party affiliation.9" Deadline requirements
judged violations of the constitution included rules setting special deadlines for ballot qualification by minor parties, 99 or prohibiting ballot
access for a candidate filing as an independent after his party had
failed to meet a qualification deadline.10 State laws on candidate petitions for ballot positions failed to pass constitutional muster when
they varied greatly from office to office in a state, 1 ' featured proportional schemes that weakened the principle of voter equality or
weighed some regions more heavily in the signature gathering process, ' 2
96. McCarthy v. Briscoe, 429 U.S. 1317 (Marshall, Circuit Justice 1976).
97. King v. Willis, 333 F. Supp. 670 (D. Del. 1971).
98. MacBride v. Exon, 558 F.2d 443 (8th Cir. 1977); McCarthy v. Austin, 423
F. Supp. 990 (W.D. Mich. 1976); McCarthy v. Tribbitt, 421 F. Supp. 1193 (D. Del.
1976).
99. Whig Party v. Seigelman, 500 F. Supp. 1195 (N.D. Ala. 1980).
100. Crussel v. Oklahoma State Election Bd., 497 F. Supp. 646.(W.D. Okla.
1980).
101. Greaves v. State Bd. of Elections, 508 F. Supp. 78 (E.D.N.C. 1980).
102. Illinois State Bd. of Elections v. Socialist Workers Party, 440 U.S. 173
(1979); Moore v. Ogilvie, 394 U.S. 814 (1969), overruling, MacDougall v. Green,
335 U.S. 281 (1948).
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ended signature gathering "arbitrarily" well before the election,' 3 required very large numbers of signatures, 1 4 required signatures only
of non-party members,' 0° or required that a maximum limit on
signatures not be exceeded.' 6 In cases resulting from the independent candidacy of John B. Anderson in 1980, federal courts overturned laws forcing him to file for ballot access far ahead of party
candidates,' 7 and preventing him, after qualification for the ballot,
0
from filling the vacancy for his vice-presidential running mate.' In
addition federal courts considered the applicability of laws which would
label Anderson a sore loser and prevent him from running as an in09
dependent after withdrawing from the Republican Party primary.'
Eventually one of Anderson's challenges reached the Supreme Court,
which reviewed his challenge to an Ohio statute requiring petitions
of independent candidates for a ballot position to be submitted in
March of a presidential year.' 0 In considering the validity of the statute
the Court balanced associational and "freedom of choice" rights of
voters against state claims that the statute promoted voter education,
equal treatment of all candidates, and political stability by preventing sore losers from running.II' The Court struck the balance in favor
of the voter's rights, dismissing the state arguments based on the finding that the law did little to foster voter education in an age of
electronic communication, that the law did not foster equal treatment
since it produced "entirely different" consequences for independent
2
candidates, and that Anderson was not a sore loser." Justice Rehnquist's dissent argued that the majority had erroneously distinguished
103. McCarthy v. Noel, 420 F. Supp. 799 (D.R.I. 1976); McCarthy v. Kirkpatrick,
420 F. Supp. 366 (W.D. Mo. 1976).
104. McLain v. Meier, 637 F.2d 1159 (8th Cir. 1980); Greaves v. State Bd. of
Elections, 508 F. Supp. 78 (E.D.N.C. 1980); American Party v. Jernigan, 424 F.
Supp. 943 (E.D. Ark., 1977). Cf. Jenness v. Fortson, 403 U.S. 431 (1971).
105. Webster v. Mesa, 521 F.2d 442 (9th Cir. 1975).
106. Richards v. Lavelle, 620 F.2d 144 (7th Cir. 1980) (addressing signature
requirements).
107. Anderson v. Morris, 500 F. Supp. 1095 (D. Md.) (no compelling state interest suggested), affd, 636 F.2d 55 (4th Cir. 1980).
108. Anderson v. Firestone, 499 F. Supp. 1027 (N.D. Fla. 1980).
109. Anderson v. Babb, 632 F.2d 300 (4th Cir. 1980) (State statute held inapplicable since revocation of nomination as a candidate in primary election was the
equivalent of never having participated in a presidential primary within the meaning
of the statute.); Anderson v. Hooper, 498 F. Supp. 898 (D.N.M. 1980) (statute held
inapplicable, as its purpose was to prevent party switching and not independent candidacy); Anderson v. Mills, 491 F. Supp. 1231 (E.D. Ky. 1980), aff'd in part, 664
F.2d 600, 605 (6th Cir. 1981).
110. Anderson v. Celebrezze, 460 U.S. 780 (1983).
111. Id. at 796-806.
112. Id.
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this case from Storer, and that that statute posed no threat to citizen's
associational freedoms." 3
Despite these decisions, many ballot access rulings held restrictions
on independent and minor party ballot access to be rational and not
detrimental to voter or candidate rights. The judiciary upheld some
party affiliation requirements including Delaware rules compelling
presidential nominees to affiliate with a national organization and to
form a state committee so voters may know the "qualifications and
policies of the permanent organization that supports his candidacy.'
States also may restrict obviously false or frivolous candidacies,'I
choose the names that appear on a non-binding party presidential
preference primary ballot,' 16 and compel a party to certify a single
slate of nominees when selected by means other than a primary.",
When a party fails to nominate a candidate for an office a state may
prevent an individual with a small number of write-in votes from claiming the party nomination.' 8 States can prevent persons who are holding
a public office from becoming candidates for a second public office
for which the term begins before the completion of the term of their
first elected office.' 1 9 Holding that such a restriction in a Texas statute
served a rational state interest in avoiding the costs of open offices
and special elections, four concurring members of the Court found
the law did not create invidious, arbitrary or irrational discrimination
in violation of the equal protection clause. 2 ' However, a majority
of the justices only agreed that the law did not infringe on first amendment rights of candidates.' 2'
Federal courts have upheld deadlines for filing petitions or other
notices of candidacy including a filing deadline for minor party candidates seventy-five days before the filing deadline for major party
candidates.' 2 2 Requirements compelling independent candidates to peti113. Id. at 811 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
114. King v. Willis, 333 F. Supp. 670, 675 (D. Del. 1971).
115. Thomas v. Mims, 317 F. Supp. 179, 182 (S.D. Ala. 1970) (court noted,
however, that it is difficult to distinguish. between "serious" and "frivolous" candidates); Jenness v. Little, 306 F. Supp. 925, 929 (N.D. Ga.), appeal dismissed, 397
U.S. 94 (1969).
116. Bellusco v. Poythness, 485 F. Supp. 904 (N.D. Ga. 1980).
117. American Indep. Party v. Austin, 420 F. Supp. 670 (E.D. Mich. 1976).
118. Blair v. Hebl, 498 F. Supp. 756 (W.D. Wis.), aff'd, 639 F.2d 786 (7th
Cir. 1980).
119. Clements v. Fashing, 457 U.S. 957 (1982).
120. Id. at 966-70 (Justices Rehnquist, Burger, Powell and O'Connor).
121. Id. at 971-73.
122. See Rock v. Bryant, 459 F. Supp. 64 (E.D. Ark.), aff'd, 590 F.2d 340
(8th Cir. 1978) (statute required independent candidates to solicit qualifying signatures
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tion for ballot access have also been held valid. 2' 3 As well, statutes
which have been upheld include those requiring a minimum amount
of support before ballot access must be granted to independent
candidates;' 2 4 those prohibiting party nominees who failed to
qualify demanding the opportunity to run as independents;' 2 those
providing that persons submitting fraudulent petitions or signatures
may be excluded from the ballot; 2 ' those allowing invalid signatures
to be deducted from a petition and prohibiting the addition of valid
and those imposing regional requirements
signatures after filing;
for petition signatures, where the regions were nearly equivalent in
population.' 28 Rules on ballot access that exclude "raiding" of one
party by members of another or that prevent a candidate of one party
from becoming the candidate of a second party during a four-year
period have also been held permissible.' 2 9 Finally, states may prevent
a person who voted in the primary of one party from becoming a
candidate of a second party within a two-year period.' 30 In all of
these cases the statute being challenged was found to be a reasonable
state regulation designed to protect the integrity of the electoral process

or to prevent voter confusion.

The application of the two-tier test thus had a mixed impact on
state laws designed to prevent independent mass appeals and to solidify
party domination of the nominations process. Federal judges loosened
within a 60 day period prior to a filing deadline); Ashworth v. Fortson, 424 F. Supp.
1178 (N.D. Ga. 1976) (Georgia election provision required minor party candidacy
party notice 150 days prior to election, major party candidates were to file at least
75 days prior to election).
123. Salera v. Tucker, 399 F. Supp. 1258, 1266 (E.D. Pa. 1975), aff'd, 424
U.S. 959 (1976). A state law was also upheld that precluded voters from signing
more than one candidacy petition for an office. See Socialist Worker's Party v.
Rockefeller, 314 F. Supp. 984, 993 (S.D.N.Y.), aff'd, 400 U.S. 806 (1970).
124. Commoner v. DuPont, 501 F. Supp. 778 (D. Del. 1980).
125. MacBride v. Askew, 541 F.2d 465 (5th Cir. 1976).
126. Eccles v. Gargiulo, 497 F. Supp 419 (E.D.N.Y. 1980).
127. Mandel v. Bradley, 432 U.S. 173 (1977).
128. Udall v. Bowen, 419 F. Supp. 746 (S.D. Ind.), aff'd, 425 U.S. 947 (1976)
(statute requiring candidate to obtain 500 signatures of registered voters from each
of 11 districts upheld). Cf. Zaustra v. Miller, 348 F. Supp. 847, 850 (D. Utah 1972)
(statute upheld that required political parties to obtain at least 10 signatures from
each of 10 counties) (emphasis added).
129. Lippett v. Cipollone, 337 F. Supp. 1405 (N.D. Ohio 1971) (per curiam),
aff'd, 404 U.S. 1032 (1972) (four justices dissenting).
130. Bendinger v. Ogilvie, 335 F. Supp. 572 (N.D. Ill. 1971). A Delaware statute
prohibiting voters from changing parties for a period of five and one-half months
prior to election did not violate the first or fourteenth amendments. See Commoner,
501 F. Supp. 778.
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rules that once allowed internal party leaders the security of limited
challenges to their endorsed candidates. Parties still have the edge
over independent nominees and breakaway candidates under "raiding"
laws, those governing petitions for candidacy, and they receive some
special attention under ballot access laws.
The third category of cases related to the organizational function
of parties are those involving conflicts over the physical position of
parties names on the ballot. Party members could use statutes or control of offices operating the electoral machinery to design ballots
favorable to their party, the established two parties, or the partyendorsed candidates in a primary. 3 '
In the past two decades federal courts have considered whether
election officials' practice of placing their party in a preferred position
on the ballot violated the equal protection clause by damaging voter
or candidate rights. When "substantial" evidence showed an advantage
from ballot position and that the position was determined by intentional official action to reward a party or damage certain candidates,
the courts found an equal protection violation. 3' 2 In these cases courts
relied on empirical evidence such as that provided by political scientist
Samuel Kirkpatrick in Sangmeister v. Woodward.'
Despite these rulings, federal courts have upheld state regulations
permitting the state to designate a party label for winners of a primary
and preventing others from using the same label, 3 " allowing a special
column for independent candidates, 3' limiting the party lines on a
3 and requiring
voting machine to prevent machine breakdowns,"'
nonparty candidates to be labelled "independent" on the ballot.' These
131. For illustrations, see D. HECOCK & H. BAIN, BALLOT PosITboN AND VOTER'S
CHOICE (1957); D. RAF, THE POLITICAL CONSEQUENCES OF ELECTORAL LAW (1967);

Rusk, The Effect of the Australian Ballot Reform on Split Ticket Voting: 1876-1908

64 AM. POL. ScI. REv. 1220, 1220-38 (1970); Walker, Ballot Forms and Voter Fatigue
10 MIDWEST J. POL. ScI. 448, 448-63 (1966).
132. Bohus v. Board of Election Comm'rs, 447 F.2d 821, 821-22 (7th Cir. 1971).
133. 565 F.2d 460, 465-66 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 939 (1977) (the court
did not note the specific studies, including his own, that Kirkpatrick referenced; it
merely summarized his testimony); see also McLain v. Meier, 637 F.2d 1159, 1165-67
(8th Cir. 1980); Avichai, Equality in Politics: Name Placement on Ballots, 1979 AM.
B. FOUN'D. REs. J. 141. On the more esoteric aspects of the issue, see generally Note,
Equal Protection in Ballot Positioning 28 U. FLA. L. REV. 816 (1976).
134. See Krasnoff v. Hardy, 436 F. Supp. 304, 309-10 (E.D. La. 1977). See also
Riddell v. National Democratic Party, 508 F.2d 770 (5th Cir. 1975).
135. McLain v. Meier, 637 F.2d 1159, 1167-69 (8th Cir. 1980).
136. Hudler v. Austin, 419 F. Supp. 1002, 1013 (E.D. Mich. 1976), aff'd mem.
sub nom., Allen v. Austin, 430 U.S. 924, reh'g denied, 431 U.S. 925 (1977). See
also Wetherington v. Adams, 309 F. Supp. 318, 321 (N.D. Fla. 1970).
137. Socialist Workers Party v. March Fong Eu, 591 F.2d 1252, 1261 (9th Cir.),
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regulations are rational controls which assure the integrity of the election and prevent voter confusion.
The fourth category of cases related to the organizational function
of parties addressed the issue of the rights of the party members as
an association rather than as individual voters or candidates. Beginning
with the decision in Lynch v. Torquanto,' 3 the federal courts usually
have avoided interference in internal party disputes and the party's
selection of its candidates. The court in Lynch determined that internal
party decisionmaking fell outside the realm of state action covered
by the equal protection guarantee and into the zone of private, free
' Other federal courts supported this interpretaassociational activity. 39
tion of state power in cases on the allocation of convention delegates
and party management.'" However, in Georgia v. National Democratic
Party4 ' and again in Bode v. NationalDemocratic Party, 42 the District
of Columbia Circuit Court of Appeals ruled that national party conventions involved state action, but the equal protection standard of
one-man-one-vote was not applied to convention representation procedures. Nonetheless, several district courts have concluded that convention delegate selection constitutes state action and applied the oneman-one-vote standard.""
In 1972, the Supreme Court considered two cases arising from
the Democratic Convention credential fights. First, at a special term,
the justices considered a conflict between the party leadership, headed
by Larry O'Brien, and McGovern supporters, led by state representative
Willie Brown, over the credentials of California delegates.'14 In a per
curiam decision the justices avoided the merits of the issue and barred
judicial intervention, ruling that the issue involved "relationships of
a great delicacy that are essentially political in nature,"'"" and that
cert. denied, 441 U.S. 946 (1979).

138. 343 F.2d 370 (3d Cir. 1965).
139. Id. at 372.
140. Irish v. Democratic-Farmer-Labor Party, 399 F.2d 119, 120-21 (8th Cir.
1968); Smith v. State Executive Comm., 288 F. Supp. 371, 376 (N.D. Ga. 1968).
141. 447 F.2d 1271, 1276, 1278-80 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 858 (1971).
142. 452 F.2d 1302, 1304-05, 1306-09 (D.C. Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 404 U.S.
1019 (1972).
143. Maxey v. Washington State Democratic Comm., 319 F. Supp. 673 (W.D.
Wash. 1970). In a later dispute over the apportionment of delegates at a state party
convention, a district court judge again found state action violating the one-manone-vote standard. Redfearn v. Delaware Republican State Comm., 362 F. Supp.
65 (D. Del.), rev'd on other grounds, 502 F.2d 1123 (3d Cir. 1974), modified, 393
F. Supp. 372 (D. Del. 1975).
144. O'Brien v. Brown, 409 U.S. 1 (1972).
145. Id. at 4 (citation omitted).
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"the convention itself is the proper forum for determining intra-party
disputes as to which delegates shall be seated."' 4 6 In another case,
Cousins v. Wigoda,'"I involving a credentials fight between delegates
from Cook County, Illinois, Justice Rehnquist as circuit justice refused
to call a special session of the Supreme Court. He returned the case
to the Illinois courts and, with the convention imminent, effectively
left the convention delegates to resolve their own credentials fight.
The Illinois courts upheld the state law governing delegate selection
over the party's asserted right to control its own delegate selection
processes.' 8 The Supreme Court reconsidered Cousins in 1975. Justice
Brennan's opinion for the Court held that the party's rights to political
association required any regulation of convention delegates to serve
a compelling state interest. He found no such interest, but stated that
"[t]he Convention serves the pervasive national interest in the selection
of candidates for national office, and this national interest is greater
than any interest of an individual State."'4 9 His broaching of the idea
of a national interest to be considered in parties' disputes drew support
from four other justices, but it did not appear as a major concern
50
in later decisions.
At the time of the Cousins action, the Court of Appeals for the
Fifth Circuit faced another convention delegate case. A panel of that
court found state action in the Republican Party practice of awarding
additional "victory bonus" delegates to states with republican victories in the 1972 presidential election and 1972 and 1974 Senate,
House, and gubernatorial elections.' The Court then ruled that the
practice was a prima facie violation of the one-man-one-vote equal
protection standard and was invidiously discriminatory.' The court
of appeals reconsidered this decision en banc, and left the question
of judicial intervention in something of a muddle. The opinion of
the court reserved judgment on the state action issue and declined
to consider the justiciability of the dispute, leaving the status of party

146. Id.
147. 409 U.S. 1201 (1972). See A. RANNEY, supra note 29, at 86-91 for
background on the convention delegate cases.
148. Wigoda v. Cousins, 14 I11.
App. 3d 460, 302 N.E.2d 614 (1973).
149. Cousins v. Wigoda, 419 U.S. 477, 490 (1975).
150. See Note, Cousins v. Wigoda: Primary Elections, Delegate Selection, and
the National Party Convention, 70 Nw. U.L. REv. 699 (1975).
151. Ripon Soc'y v. National Republican Party, 525 F.2d 548, 550-55 (D.C.
Cir. 1975) (case heard by Chief Judge Bazelon, Senior Circuit Judge Danaher, and
U.S. district judge for the Eastern District of Texas), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 933 (1976).
152. Id. at 555-59.
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delegate selection rules as public or private in limbo.'5 3 But, the opinion
did overrule the panel's application of the apportionment standard
to delegate selection, permitting the party to use selection schemes
to "rationally advance some legitimate interest of the party in winning
elections or otherwise achieving its political goals."1' 5 4 Party associa-

tional freedom of action thus was deemed to outweigh voting rights
of members, since the process of delegate selection did not immediately
result in the selection of public officials.' 5
The federal courts refrained from interfering with internal party
decisionmaking processes in several other situations. State party committee selection processes precipitated challenges based on equal protection. Finding that no governmental or representative functions were
performed by a state committee, a district court ruled that the election
of these party leaders was "not an integral phase of the state-created
election process...,56 A second challenge to state party committee
selection processes reached the Supreme Court, but the Court refused
to apply equal protection standards applicable in voting cases to committee selection challenges.' The Court held that, except for a few
duties of the committee directly related to elections and defined by
statute, the party remained free to manage its own internal affairs.' 8
In a dispute among party factions over party nominations, a Michigan
district court concluded that "long-established tradition" as well as
associational rights prevented judicial interference in internal party
matters.' 9 State statutes regulating party convention delegate selection
by compelling the use of an open primary rather than a caucus
system,' 60 and those prohibiting party executive committees from endorsing primary candidates'
have also been rejected because they
interfered with the first amendment rights of the party membership.
In addition, party executives have been allowed to "enforce reasonable
discipline among ... [members] so long as there is no violation of
16 2
constitutional or federally protected rights."
153. Ripon Soc'y v. National Republican Party, 525 F.2d 567 (D.C. Cir.
cert. denied, 424 U.S. 933 (1976).
154. Id. at 586-87.
155. Id. at 588-89.
156. Dahl v. Republican State Comm., 319 F. Supp. 682, 685 (W.D. Wash.
157. Marchioro v. Chaney, 442 U.S. 191, 197 (1979).
158. Id. at 199.
159. American Indep. Party v. Austin, 420 F. Supp. 670, 674 (E.D. Mich.
160. See, e.g., Ferency v. Austin, 493 F. Supp. 683 (W.D. Mich. 1980),
666 F.2d 1023 (6th Cir. 1981).
161. See, e.g., Abrams v. Reno, 452 F. Supp. 1166 (S.D. Fla. 1978),
649 F.2d 342 (5th Cir. 1981).

162. Jackson v. Riddell, 476 F. Supp. 849, 860 (N.D. Miss. 1979).

1975),

1970).
1976).

aff'd,

aff'd,
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The freedom of a political party in selecting its nominees and
establishing its internal operating rules again reached the Supreme
Court in 1981. In Democratic Party v. Wisconsin ex rel. La Follette,'6 3
a conflict had arisen based on discrepancies between state law and
party rules on the selection of delegates to the national party convention; the Court adhered to the drift of rulings since Cousins. Wisconsin
held an open presidential preference primary and required delegates
at the convention to vote in accordance with primary results. Delegates
to the convention were publicly recorded Democrats whom the party
selected for participation at the convention. After the convention, the
Democrats challenged the state law. The Court ruled that the state
had burdened party members' rights since, "a political party's choice
among the various ways of determining the makeup of a State's delegation to the party's national convention is protected by the
Constitution."' 6 " The Court refused to permit judicial or state interference with delegate selection.' 65 Consequently, parties are free to
conduct their internal decisionmaking processes as they see fit. States
still may regulate party decisionmaking immediately affecting the voting
process, but the courts have not applied rigid equal protection standards to party decisionmaking unless the party decision directly and
66
severely impaired voter equality.'
The final category of cases concerning the party organizational
function involves campaign finance. Campaign finance laws enacted
during the past decade often assure public funding and restrict a party's
contributions to its nominees, thus impairing party control over the
appeals, policies, and attachments of nominees and reducing incentives
for party loyalty by nominees. Yet, parties have challenged campaign
finance laws far less frequently than candidates and interest groups.
163. Democratic Party of the United States v. Wisconsin ex rel. La Follette,
450 U.S. 107 (1981).
164. Id. at 124.

165. Id. at 124, 126.
166. For an example of the application of the standard, see the litigation involving cross-filing of candidacies in New York using a balancing of voter and party
associational rights. Mrazek v. Suffolk County Bd. of Elections, 630 F.2d 890 (2d
Cir. 1980); Seergy v. Kings County Republican County Comm., 459 F.2d 308 (2d
Cir. 1972); Restivo v. Conservative Party, 391 F. Supp. 813 (S.D.N.Y. 1975);
Clark v. Rose, 379 F. Supp. 73 (S.D.N.Y. 1974), aff'd, 531 F.2d 56 (1976). In these
cases the party's role in filling ballot vacancies by certifying candidates who were
members of other parties was considered state action, but the malapportioned selection of party leaders who certified candidates was not deemed to violate a fundamental
right of voters protected by the equal protection clause.
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Despite the paucity of decisions, federal courts have developed
a clear policy on the treatment of parties' challenges to campaign
finance laws. The policy is that the reporting of party financial support
of campaigns does not normally abridge the associational rights of
the party or its members'6 7 and that the system of public funding
of candidacies through tax check-off provisions and control of party
expenditures does not individually discriminate for or against any
party.'68 Judges permit public financing even though the apportionment
of funds does not serve all parties or candidates equally. The federal
government and the states thus retain broad control over the use of
monetary incentives by parties.
2.

Party in Government

The governmental function of parties is at issue when the capability of government to restrict the party activities of bureaucrats or the
use of patronage employment practices by executives is litigated.
Federal courts consistently have upheld federal and state statutes restricting the party activity of most executive bureaucrats. In 1947,
69
the Supreme Court in United Public Workers of America v. Mitchell1
upheld the federal Hatch Act restrictions on after-working-hours party
activity by a federal employee. "' Using a rationality test, the Court
held that the right to participate in party politics could be outweighed
by regulations controlling party activity "reasonably deemed by Congress to interfere with the efficiency of the public service."'' The
Court soon thereafter applied the same theory for state officials whose
positions were funded by the federal government, " and eventually
upheld state laws restricting party activity in a manner similar to the
167. See, e.g., Oregon Socialist Workers 1974 Campaign Comm. v. Paulus, 432
F. Supp. 1255 (D. Or. 1977); Pichler v. Jennings, 347 F. Supp. 1061, 1069 (S.D.N.Y.
1972). But see Brown v. Socialist Workers '74 Campaign Comm., 459 U.S. 87 (1982)
(held that a minor party can refuse to file financial reports because of evidence of
a "reasonable probability" that first amendment rights would be infringed by hostile
private persons or government).
168. See, e.g., Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 95-108 (1976); Bang v. Chase,
442 F. Supp. 758, 765-68 (D. Minn. 1977), aff'd, 436 U.S. 941 (.1978); Murray v.
Norberg, 423 F. Supp. 795 (D.R.I. 1976). See also Isfin, Resolving Constitutional

Issues under the.Federal Election Campaign Act: A Procedural Labyrinth, 10 N.Y.U.
REv. L. & Soc. CHANGE 101, 101-10 (1980-81).
169.
170.
171.
172.

330 U.S. 75 (1947).
Id.at 95, 100-03.
Id. at 101.
Oklahoma v. United States Civil Serv. Comm'n, 330 U.S. 127 (1947).
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Hatch Act."7 3 In 1973, the Court reconsidered the Hatch Act, but
ruled that, "our judgment is that neither the First Amendment nor
any other provision of the Constitution invalidates a law barring this
kind of partisan political conduct by federal employees."

74

The federal

employees thus could not participate in party fund raising, hold par-

ty offices, assist a candidate for office during a campaign, solicit votes,

serve at party conventions, or perform a variety of related partisan

activities. "I
Supreme Court action as well as lower court decisions in various
Hatch Act cases rest on a mass solidary definition of the function
of parties. For example, the Supreme Court has refused to review
lower court decisions upholding Hatch Act restrictions on campaign
activity of employees of a local authority spending federal grants, " 6
and a local regulation prohibiting non-partisan political campaigning
by municipal government employees because it could produce
favoritism in political behavior or an advantage for incumbents.'"
A district court decision upholding the Legal Services Corporation
Act's ban on partisan and non-partisan campaigns by employees of a
government corporation was not even appealed.' Political activity
by public employees has survived scrutiny only in narrowly defined
areas, 1 when statutes and rules to control political activity are so
broad and vague that they impinge on non-political activities,' 80 or
when the countervailing interest could be served by more narrowly
drawn lines,' 8 ' or when the activity is in the planning or conjectural
173. 5 U.S.C. § 7324 (1983). See, e.g., Brodrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601
(1973).
174. United States Civil Serv. Comm'n v. National Ass'n of Letter Carriers,
413 U.S. 548, 556 (1973). In the absence of a law and in non-party matters public
employees have free speech rights. See Pickering v. Board of Educ., 391 U.S. 563
(1968).
175. 5 U.S.C. § 7324 (1983).
176. Northern Va. Regional Park Auth. v. United States Civil Serv. Comm'n,
437 F.2d 1346, 1351-52 (4th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 403 U.S. 936 (1972). See also
In re Higginbroth, 340 F.2d 165 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 853 (1965).
177. Magill v. Lynch, 560 F.2d 22 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1063 (1977).
178. Smith v. Ehrlich, 430 F. Supp. 818 (D.D.C. 1976).
179. Democratic State Cent. Comm. v. Andolsek, 249 F. Supp. 1009 (D. Md.
1966) (federal employees in certain areas excepted from the Hatch Act by Civil Service Commission regulation cannot participate in party campaigns but can engage
in selected nonpartisan activities).
180. McNea v. Garey, 434 F. Supp. 95 (N.D. Ohio 1976) (upheld a local ordinance prohibiting police officers from, and penalizing them for, participating in partisan political activity, and prohibiting selected contacts with politicians, but struck
down as overbroad limitations on political discussions by the officers).
181. Mancuso v. Taft, 476 F.2d 187, 197-200 (1st Cir. 1973) (permitted police
officer to remain in the classified service of the city despite candidacy for the state
legislature because the statute too broadly restricted political activity).
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phase. '82 The cases on public employment thus promote a bureaucracy
unfettered by party influence.
Strengthening the judicial support of a neutral bureaucracy, indicative of a mass solidary definition of the governing function of a party,
are the patronage decisions. In Elrod v. Burns,'83 the Court applied
the Williams v. Rhodes'8 4 compelling interest test in holding that a
public employee's rights to expression had been abridged by state
action-his dismissal because of his party affiliation.' 8 5 The Court
stated that, "[t]he threat of dismissal for failure to provide that support
[assistance to party election campaigns] unquestionably inhibits protected belief and association, and dismissal for failure to provide support only penalizes its exercise."' 86 The opinion also denied contentions that compelling state interests permitted patronage dismissals.
The Court found that state interests in making employees accountable
to elected officials, securing loyalty to the policy goals of the party
in power, protecting the stability of the party system, and contributing
in other possible ways to the electoral process were not compelling
reasons for allowing the sheriff of Cook County, Illinois to invoke
partisan dismissals.' 8 7
Later, in a case involving the partisan dismissal of assistant public
defenders in Rockland County, New York, the Court ruled that partisan dismissals could only be justified upon demonstration "that party
affiliation is an appropriate requirement for the effective performance
of the public office involved."' 8 8 Thus, even dismissal of some confidential or executive policymaking officials for partisan reasons may
be impermissible. The end result of the judicial attack on patronage
may not yet be in sight. After a decade of litigation ended in a consent
agreement on the patronage practices in Cook County, Illinois,' 8 9 the
courts appeared to be moving against assorted partisan hiring, firing,
and promotion practices as well as the use of public funds with a
partisan bias.'"9 The court, however, soon retreated from considering
whether partisan hiring practices were legal.' 9 '
182. Simmons v. Stanton, 502 F. Supp. 932 (W.D. Mich. 1980).
183. 427 U.S. 347, 356-57 (1976).
184. 393 U.S. 23, 31 (1968).
185. 427 U.S. at 373.
186. Id.at 359.
187. Id.at 366-70.
188. Branti v. Finkel, 445 U.S. 507, 518 (1980). For a critique of Elrod and
Branti, see Meier, Ode to Patronage: A Critical Analysis of Two Recent Supreme
Court Decisions, 41 PUB. AD. REV. 558, 558-63 (1981).
189. Shakman v. Democratic Org., 481 F. Supp. 1315 (N.D. Ill. 1979).
190. Id. at 1341.
1981). See Mazus
191. Shakman v. Democratic Org., 508 F. Supp. 1063 (N.D. I11.
v. Department of Transp., 629 F.2d 870, 873 (3d Cir. 1980).
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3.

Party in the Electorate

Another function of American political parties receiving attention
from the federal courts is the function of the party in the electorate,
including the integration, aggregation, and mobilization of its membership for political action. Some aspects of this function questioned
through litigation include the freedom of individuals to join or "integrate" themselves into a party, and the ability of a party to use
various types of expression to "mobilize" or rouse an electorate. The
adherents of any political persuasion may organize a party, and the
outlawing of a party is a violation of the constitutional prohibition
on bills of attainder and of the fourteenth amendment due process
and equal protection guarantees.' 92 Some regulations of membership,
however, are valid. Party registration laws can regulate individual
membership in a party.' 93 These laws usually protect the party from
members who might pervert its beliefs or objectives.
In 1973 the Supreme Court reviewed a New York law requiring
persons to register as party members thirty days before a November
election so they could then qualify to vote in the June party primary
the next year. The decision in Rosario v. Rockefeller, 94 upheld the
law because it was "tied to a particularized legitimate purpose, and
• . .in no sense invidious or arbitrary,''' 9' and was designed for the
"preservation of the integrity of the electoral process ... .'196 The
Court distinguished this law from an Illinois law prohibiting a person
who voted in the primary of one party from voting in the primary
of a second party for a twenty-three month period. In Kusper v.
Pontikes, 91 the Court concluded that the Illinois law deprived a woman
of her "voice in choosing the party's candidates, and thus substantially
abridged her ability to associate effectively with the party of her
choice." 1 91 Of particular moment in distinguishing the cases was the
inaction of plaintiff Rosario in registering to vote in contrast to the
Kusper plaintiff who did make an effort to vote and was denied the
right to vote because of her own inaction. The Court underplayed
the vital role of state action in creating the Rosario rules.' 99
A Connecticut law establishing a closed primary election and pro192. Blawis v. Bolin, 358 F. Supp. 349 (D. Ariz. 1973).
193. See L. TRIBE, supra note 95, at 790-91.

194. 410 U.S. 752 (1973).
195.
196.
197.
198.
199.

Id. at 762.
Id.at 761.
Kusper v. Pontikes, 414 U.S. 51 (1973).
Id.at 58.
Id. at 60. See also L. TRIBE, supra note 95, at 791-93.
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hibiting non-party members from voting won sanction from a three
judge court in Nader v. Schaffer.2"' The district court ruled that the
state could close the primary to protect the rights of association of
party members, concluding that, "Itihe rights of party members may
to some extent offset the importance of claimed conflicting rights
asserted by persons challenging some aspect of the candidate selection
process." 2 ' The court recognized the validity of the law because the
assertion of party rights was achieved without impermissibly impinging
upon the counterveiling interests since voters could register up to within
eighteen days of the primary, could participate in political associations
and promote non-party candidates, were not harassed or coerced by
2 2
the rule, and because they had chosen their course of non-affiliation.
Another federal court ruled that failures of voters "to take reasonable
and timely measures to change their registration" and to integrate
themselves with a party could prevent their voting.2" 3
The ability of a party to mobilize and organize support through
the expression of a set of policy options, a platform, or a program
came into question in a few federal cases involving minor parties.
The guiding principle in these cases is that the right of free expression
prevents interference with declarations of party policy.2"" As Chief
2 5
Justice Warren wrote, in dicta, in Sweezy v. New Hampshire," "[a]ny
interference with the freedom of a party is simultaneously an interference with the freedom of its adherents. All political ideas cannot
and should not be channeled into the programs of our two major
parties. ' 20 6 Building on this concept of freedom in the enunciation
of policy positions, the Court disallowed loyalty oath requirements
7
for a party's candidates in Communist Party v. Whitcomb2" because
they burdened free expression. A similar Louisiana law also failed
to satisfy constitutional free expression standards because it amounted
to "an obvious penalty placed on mere political beliefs or mem20 8 Parties
bership in an organization having illegal political aims."
200.
201.
202.
203.
204.

417 F. Supp. 837 (D. Conn.), aff'd, 429 U.S. 989 (1976).
Id. at 845.
Id. at 842-44, 848-49. See also supra note 166.
Young v. Gardner, 497 F. Supp. 396, 402 (D.N.H. 1980).
Stromberg v. California, 283 U.S. 359, 368-70 (1931).

205. 354 U.S. 234 (1957).

206. Id. at 250-51. See also Noto v. United States, 367 U.S. 290, 298-99 (1961).
207. 414 U.S. 441 (1974). See also Socialist Workers Party v. Hill, 483 F.2d
554 (5th Cir. 1973).
208. Socialist Workers Party v. Hardy, 480 F. Supp. 941, 945 (E.D. La. 1977),
aff'd, 607 F.2d 704 (5th Cir. 1979).

NORTHERN ILLINOIS UNIVERSITY LA W REVIEW

will find that free expression permits them to mobilize both their
members and the public as long as individual members do not advocate
immediate violent activity.2 "9
4.

Summary

Judicial action in cases concerning political parties seems lacking
in central, unifying principles. The decisions featured a weighing and
balancing of the rights of voters to equal protection of the laws, the
right to seek public office as a candidate, the first amendment associational and expressive rights of party members, and the separate state
and national governmental interests in assuring an honest and fair
electoral process beneficial to the representation of the public. With
these varied concerns and litigation often challenging peculiar statutes
or appearing in peculiar circumstances, the courts did not establish
a consistent constitutional status for parties. Some judicial decisions
strongly support behavior characterizing mass solidary definitions of
the role of parties, as did those dealing with the Hatch Act and patronage. Yet, the judiciary upheld powers held by party leaders of the
sort characteristic of machine-based or policymaking definitions of
party roles in some of the party membership, party internal affairs,
and convention delegate cases. Ballot access case decisions created
more opportunity for sociopsychological candidate appeals and weakened party leaders' power, although not to the extent that the special
power of party leaders needed for machine-based or policymaking
parties has totally vanished.
C. JUDICIAL INACTION

A major reason for confusion in the judicial definition of the
role of American political parties is the failure to consider the objectives
of parties and the functions of parties that support their objective.
Federal court decisions especially have neglected consideration of the
proper objectives of American parties. No definition of the place of
parties in the governmental process has been tendered, save four
statements written by Justice Lewis Powell. In the Rosario v.
Rockefeller"' party pre-registration and membership case, Powell
dissented and urged that the restrictive law be voided.2"' His reasoning
209. See, e.g., Communist Party of the United States v. Subversive Activities
Control Bd., 367 U.S. 1 (1961) (party required to reveal membership list because
of appeal to violence and efforts to destroy the government). Cf. Terminello v.
Chicago, 337 U.S. 1, 4-5 (1949) (permitted speech creating unrest but not presenting
a threat to the existence of government).
210. 410 U.S. 752 (1973).
211. Id. at 769 (Powell, J., dissenting).
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indicated a belief that parties should be defined as mass solidary
organizations; Justice Powell wrote:
Political parties in this country traditionally have been
characterized by a fluidity and overlap of philosophy and membership. And citizens generally declare or alter party affiliation for
reasons quite unconnected with any premeditated intention to disrupt
or frustrate the plans of a party with which they are not in sympathy. Citizens customarily choose a party and vote in its primary
simply because it presents candidates and issues more responsive to
their immediate concerns and aspirations. Such candidates or issues
often are not apparent eight to 11 months before a primary."1 '
Powell repeated the same conception of meaning of a party in his
dissent in Democratic National Committee v. Wisconsin ex rel. La
Follette,2" 3 where he used historical evidence to argue that American
parties were loose, non-ideological aggregations of individuals sociopsychologically linked to candidates. 14
But, Justice Powell's dissents in Elrod v. Burns"5 and Branti v.
Finkel2" ' evidence inconsistency in his thinking regarding parties. In
both cases he contended that patronage firing practices were justifiable,
and espoused an essentially machine-based definition of the role of
parties. In Elrod he argued that patronage stimulated political activity,
especially in obscure races, allowed parties an incentive for encouraging
local activity, and should be allowed to remain if local politicians
judged it a needed practice.2" 7 In support of material incentives, he
wrote that, "as every politician knows, the hope of some reward
generates a major portion of the local political activity supporting
parties." 2 8' His Branti dissent went further in support of patronage,
claiming that, "[p]atronage appointments help build stable political
parties by offering rewards to persons who assume the tasks necessary
to the continued functioning of political organizations." 2 9' Powell's
concern in Branti was that a lack of patronage would produce a
"failure to sustain party discipline" and the erosion of parties.2 2 The
footnotes in Justice Powell's Branti dissent indicated a familiarity with
contemporary literature on party transformation and decline, and he
feared the decline of parties "well may impair the right of local voters
212. Id.
213. 450 U.S. 107 (1981).
214. Id. at 131-36 (Powell, J., dissenting).
215. 427 U.S. 347 (1976).

216.
217.
218.
219.
220.

445
427
Id.
445
Id.

U.S. 507 (1980).
U.S. at 382-86 (Powell, J., dissenting).
at 385.
U.S. at 527-28 (Powell, J., dissenting).
at 531.
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to structure their government."" '' Powell's two different definitions
of the role of parties will not resolve the difficulties created when
the judiciary ignores the objectives of a vital political institution while
judging its behavior.
Additional confusion in the judicial definition of the status of
parties is caused by the incompleteness of judicial action dealing with
party functions. In party organization cases the recruitment of candidates by the parties drew peripheral attention in ballot access cases
and the La Follette case, but some state statutory provisions still restrict
the recruitment process to persons of an age different from the voting
age, to non-felons, and to a certain occupation (for judges and
prosecutors).222 The cost of elections also may restrict leadership recruitment, but the judiciary has not considered cases involving an inequity
which probably adversely affects some parties. Most campaign finance
judgments and court decisions in general have neglected some aspects
of party election activity which are currently emerging, such as affiliations between parties, candidates, and political action committees
(PAC's).223 In most cases involving PAC's the federal judges have
confined review to the interpretation of statutory
language, and they
224
have largely avoided first amendment issues.
Regarding the governmental function of parties, federal judges
have failed to consider practices of party organization and leadership,
party patronage practices, and other partisan behavior in legislatures.
Legislative efforts to create laws with partisan ramifications, like a
state reapportionment law, have been deemed matters in which
"judicial interest should be at its lowest ebb. ' 225 Executive partisanship
221. Id. at 532. At page 531 Justice Powell makes reference to journalistic
analyses of the state of parties. D. BRODER, THE PARTY'S OVER (1972).
222. See Note, Developments in the Law-Elections 88 HARv. L. REV. 1111,
1217-33 (1975) (discusses candidate eligibility).
223. See Sorauf, Political Parties and Political Action Committees: Two Life
Cycles, 22 ARIZ. L. REV. 445 (1980); Swillinger, Federal Regulation of the Campaign Finance Activity of Trade Associations: An Overview, 29 EMORY L.J. 395 (1980);
Wertheimer & Huwa, Campaign Finance Reform: Past Accomplishments, Future
Challenges, 10 N.Y.U. REV. L. & Soc. CHANGE 43 (1980-81).
224. See Common Cause v. Harrison Schmitt, 455 U.S. 129 (1982); Bread Pol.
Action Comm. v. Federal Election Comm'n, 455 U.S. 577 (1981); Citizens Against
Rent Control/Coalition for Fair Hous. v. City of Berkeley, 454 U.S. 290 (1981);
Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976); International Ass'n of Machinists, Etc. v. Federal
Election Comm'n, 678 F.2d 1092 (D.C. Cir. 1982); Walther v. Federal Election
Comm'n, 468 F. Supp. 1235 (D.D.C. 1979). Compare Federal Election Comm'n v.
National Right to Work Comm., 459 U.S. 197 (1982) with Let's Help Fla. v. McCrary,
621 F.2d 195 (5th Cir. 1980), aff'd, Firestone v. Let's Help Fla., 454 U.S. 1130 (1981).
225. Gaffney v. Cummings, 412 U.S. 735, 754 (1973).
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in policymaking and the delivery of government services also has
escaped judicial scrutiny.
Despite some interest in the integration, aggregation and mobilization of party members, many issues related to the function of parties
in the electorate remain unexplored. Most important, the definition
of party membership remains unclear. Are only registered voters party
members? Who are party members in states without party registration?
laws,2 2 6
Can restraints on the right to vote such as durational residency
228 prevent party
literacy tests,22 7 and bans on voting by ex-felons
membership?
Another unresolved issue involving the role of parties in the electorate is the mobilization of voters and the party function of articulating policy positions. Parties can use the streets and "public forums"
229 The United States Postal
to articulate their views and rouse support.
Service may not invidiously discriminate against parties by restricting
their use of the mails in a different manner than it does for other
organizations.2 30 Yet, parties do not have an unconditional right of
23 1 probably the most effective means
access to the electronic media,
of mobilizing people and articulating policy views today. Issues of
the content of party policy statements probably fall under the standards
that regulate individual speech and "speech plus" activities of associations,2 3 2 although no judicial rulings, except for the loyalty oath
cases discussed above, come close to providing a guarantee.
226. Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330, 343 (1972).
227. Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. 12 (1970); Lassiter v. Northampton Election
Bd., 360 U.S. 45 (1959).
228. See, e.g., Richardson v. Ramirez, 418 U.S. 24 (1974). Cf. Manhattan State
Citizens' Group Inc. v. Bass, 524 F. Supp. 1270 (S.D.N.Y. 1981) (dealing with mental
patients).
229. See PruneYard Shopping Center v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74 (1980); Southeastern
Promotions, Ltd. v. Conrad, 420 U.S. 546, 555 (1976).
230. Greenberg v. Bolger, 497 F. Supp. 756 (E.D.N.Y. 1980).
231. Columbia Broadcasting Sys. Inc. v. Democratic Nat'l Comm., 412 U.S.
94 (1973). Neither is candidate access constitutionally guaranteed, Miami Herald

Publishing Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241 (1974); Van Gelder, PresidentialDebates:

A Case Study of the Federal Election Commission's Regulation of CandidateAppearances, 29 EMORY L.J. 339 (1980). However, a provision of the Communications Act
of 1934 and the Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971 allow legally qualified federal
candidates an enforceable right to purchase television or radio time if their request
is "reasonable" as determined by the FCC. See CBS, Inc. v. Federal Communications
Comm'n, 453 U.S. 367 (1981).
232. Party statements thus would be governed by International Bhd. of Teamsters,
Local 695 v. Vogt,' 354 U.S. 284, 288-95 (1957), which extended free speech protection
to associational demonstrations, and Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 536, 555 (1965)
in which protection of associational activity received a lesser degree of protection
than verbal expression. See L. TRIBE, supra note 95, at 598-601.
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D.

JUDICIAL CHOICES AND THE TRANSFORMATION OF PARTIES

The net effect of the litigation pertaining to parties is a commingling
of several aspects of the integrated definitions of parties provided in
Table I and the lack of a consistent definition of the objectives of
parties. The hodgepodge of rulings does not confirm any stable constitutional status for parties. At times the federal judiciary has recognized the fundamental need for the party to service collective public
demands, but more frequently the judges have emphatically held individual rights to be more critical than the equilibrium that parties
of any form could provide to electoral and policy formation processes.
With the organic constitutional status of parties eroding as a consequence of litigation, the party has begun to be transformed into a
less significant institution.
IV.

THE RATIONALE FOR JUDICIAL CHOICES ON PARTY STATUS

The decisions of the federal judiciary in cases concerning parties
tell little as to why the judiciary chose its course of action. It is doubtful that federal judges set out to confuse the constitutional status of
parties in a way that contributed to the undermining of party stability.
More plausible is the conclusion that the federal judiciary rather absentmindedly and incrementally undercut the incentives for machine-based
parties, failed to reason out a complete mass solidary definition of
parties, and simply bypassed and ignored other ways of defining the
role of parties in American governance. This conclusion, likely as it
may be, still presents a problem. Why did the justices fail to rationalize
and define a consistent constitutional status for parties in American
politics?
Three answers can be offered to this question. First, no single
set of litigants pursued party cases and those cases which did arise
were "last resort" appeals by parties playing an unusual or marginal
role in the political process. Therefore the judiciary was not presented
with the kinds of cases which afford an opportunity to work out a
consistent definition of the status of parties. Although this response
probably accounts for the failure of the ballot access cases to address
larger issues, it cannot totally account for the Supreme Court justices'
neglect of the question of the constitutional status of parties. As Justice
Powell's dissents in Rosario, Elrod, La Follette and Branti illustrate,
the Court could have used these cases to clarify the role of parties.
Or, at least the Court might have defined more precisely how the
political branches should define the role of parties to overcome the
confusion left in the wake of its own decisions. However, the first
answer does not adequately resolve the problem.
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A second response to the question is that the structure of constitutional discourse prevented the definition of a consistent status for
parties. Specifically the language of the "state action" doctrine
prevented judicial definition of a consistent constitutional role for parties. A quick review of the parties' cases reveals that some decisions
view the political party as an entity performing a public function and
cooperating as an organ of the state,23 while other decisions view
parties as private associations. 3 4 The two-sided view of parties permits
some functions of parties to be controlled by the judiciary through
the equal protection clause, while other functions are judged private
associational rights beyond the role of judicial action.
When activities of political parties are found to involve state action, the judiciary can apply the equal protection clause to support
voter or candidate rights as in Williams v. Rhodes13 ' and Lubin v.
2 36 or it may hold the state interest in promoting parties is more
Panish
compelling than voter or candidate rights as in Storer v. Brown237
and Rosario v. Rockefeller.23 When no state action is involved the
courts hold that parties' activities are not subject to strict constitutional
scrutiny as evidenced by convention delegate cases such as La
Follette.23 9 These decisions imply that parties have characteristics which
are both private and public in nature. The decisions view parties as
private associations responding to the inclinations of the members of
the moment and as associations endowed by governments with powers
or functions that make them instruments of the state. The involvement
of parties in public life through electoral, governmental, and organizational functions has not yet been judged to bring all of their activities
within the realm of state action.
Due to the use of the state action criteria, the judiciary can define
only partially the status of political parties. Despite the important
role that parties can and do play in the governance of the state, courts
have interpreted the constitution as allowing judicial intervention only
when the law officially regulates a party, creates a public function
for parties, or entangles parties in government decisions.214 The great
range of party activity indirectly but vitally affecting leadership selection
233. See, e.g., Terry v. Adams, 345 U.S. 461 (1953); Smith v. Allwright, 321

U.S. 649 (1944).

234. See, e.g., Cousins v. Wigoda, 409 U.S. 1201 (1972).
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and policy options is left to be guided by the political forces of the
moment. It is little wonder that judicial action cannot fix a role for
parties or prevent the transformation. Indeed, the limited range of
judicial actions allows a dual-judicial and private-definition of party
responsibilities.
A third response to the question lies in the style of judicial reasoning used when approaching problems of participation in governance.
The political party cases quite clearly reveal a penchant in the modern
judicial mind. Judges today concentrate heavily on individual rights
issues in matters related to the governance of the polity. Although
decisions by courts may not always favor rights claims, the language
of individual rights dominates opinion discourse. Even the associational rights are but a summation of the individual rights of party
adherents.
Despite the influence of rights, another strain of American thought
emphasizes majority rule. Most supporters of integrated definitions
of the role of parties concern themselves far less with the rights of
individuals than with the collective structure, policy, or objectives of
the party and the ability of the party to contribute to representative
politics. Yet, whatever the explicit parameters of their model of party,
supporters of viable party roles in American governance stress the
collective good resulting from the representative content of party electoral and governmental action.
Since contemporary judges are predisposed to scrutinize the rights
of individuals, their basic values often limit their intellectual sensitivity
to the public usefulness of strong collectives or institutions. True, the
judicial attention to rights claims has been effective since the 1930's
in preventing collective or institutional abuses like Jim Crow laws, 2 '
"third degree" police tactics, malapportionment, and restraint of expression. However, there is a serious question whether all strong collectives or institutions are dangerous to rights. Some, like parties, can
advance the representative values and rights of citizens if given proper
constitutional objectives and incentives and, if checked from abuses
of power by intelligently planned protections, pose little potential threat
to rights. The attention to rights has prevented judges from consideration of the valuable contributions of parties to representative politics.
Because of the pattern of litigation, the use of state action criteria,
and the emphasis on rights, the judiciary confines itself to ranges of
action that have not legitimated a constitutional status for parties nor
241. Jim Crow laws were statutes and ordinances enforcing racial segregation
in public transport, schools, parks, theaters, restaurants and other public places in
the American South from the 1870's to the 1960's.

1984:31]

AMERICAN POLITICAL PARTIES

provided a pattern of litigation that might sort out the welter of statutes
and rights that have produced disarray in the party system. Courts
have contributed to the creation of a political environment in which
parties could expire.
Yet, the judiciary might be able to assist in the restoration of
the institution of parties. To achieve this end two changes would be
necessary. First, the federal judiciary would have to come to grips
with the problem created by ignoring the definition of the objectives
of parties. To review state and federal election and party control laws
intelligently, the judges must define a status for parties. In so doing,
a balancing of interests could take place with voter and candidate
rights being compared to the objectives of the party, rather than vague
phrases like the interest in the "integrity" of elections." ' Second, party
activities must be regarded as state actions playing a fundamental role
in the governmental process. Parties should not be treated as private
associations, for they serve a vital public function as organizers of
political demands. The policymaking and internal decisions of the parties could be protected from judicial interference by the political questions doctrine, as are legislative and executive decisionmaking.1 3 Certainly these suggestions will not prevent other forces from eroding
American parties, but if collective organizations to promote the
representation of popular values are legitimate and indeed desirable,
some change in the constitutional status of parties is necessary.

242. As, for example, in Storer v. Brown, 415 U.S. 724, 736 (1974) where "integrity" is not defined by the Court.
243. On the application of the political questions doctrine in parties cases, see
O'Brien v. Brown, 409 U.S. 1, 4 (1972); Kester, ConstitutionalRestrictions on Political
Parties, 60 VA. L. REV. 735, 781-83 (1974); Rotunda, Constitutional and Statutory
Restrictions on Politices Parties in the Wake of Cousins v. Wigoda, 53 TEXAS L.
REV. 935, 960-62 (1975). For a slightly different view on this point, see McCleskey,
Parties at the Bar: Equal Protection, Freedom of Association, and Rights of Political
Organizations, 46 J. POL. 346, 366-67 (1984).

